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The district court's recognition of an independent source of water,
determination of the flow rate, and referral to the water at issue as developed water fell under this authority. Thus, the district court did not
exceed its jurisdiction..
Hidden Hollow also argued the district court erred in denying
Hidden Hollow's motion to certify the issue involving the controversy
as to the source of the respective parties' water rights to the chief water
judge. The court rejected Hidden Hollow's argument, relying again
on the determination that the district court did not exceed its jurisdiction in respect to the previous issue.
Next, the court addressed the argument that the district court erroneously shifted the burden of proof to Hidden Hollow to prove how
much water Hidden Hollow contributed to the natural drainage from
its independent source. The court stated the burden of proof rests on
the party asserting he or she is entitled to use water released into a
natural carrier from another water source. In the case at issue, the
court noted the district court weighed the evidence presented at trial
and concluded Field proved more water was imported from his water
source than the water diverted at his lower point of diversion. On the
other hand, Hidden Hollow's evidence was not as persuasive. Thus,
the district court permissibly shifted the burden of proof to Hidden
Hollow.
Finally, the court addressed the issue of whether the district court's
order regarding Hidden Hollow's water right deprived Hidden Hollow
of due process of law by ruling on issues not raised by the pleadings.
On this issue, Hidden Hollow maintained the district court permanently modified the Decree by declaring Field was entitled to all but a
0.83 miner's inches of water at his lower point of diversion. Hidden
Hollow argued that such a modification, in what was essentially an action for contempt and injunctive relief, deprived Hidden Hollow of
due process of law. However, the court held the district court did not
permanently modify the Decree, thus the district court did not deprive
Hidden Hollow of procedural and substantive protections embodied
by the due process clauses of the United States Constitution and the
Montana Constitution.
In conclusion, the court rejected all of Hidden Hollow's arguments
and affirmed the district court's holding.
Benjamin M. Petre
Paulson v. Flathead Conservation Dist., 91 P.3d 569 (Mont. 2004)
(holding the conservation district had statutory authority to determine
property owners' rights to construct a waterfront improvement project
where another state agency had concurrent jurisdiction over the project).

Issue I

COURT REPORTS

Jack and Donna Paulson ("the Paulsons") applied for and received
a permit from the Flathead Regional Development Office ("FRDO") to
construct a waterfront project ("project") on Flathead Lake. Five
months into the project's construction, the Flathead Conservation District ("FCD") notified the Paulsons the project was also in the Swan
River and, therefore, subject to FCD'sjurisdiction. Upon receiving this
notice, the Paulsons petitioned FCD for a permit, which FCD denied.
The Paulsons thereafter sought to determine whether FRDO or FCD
had jurisdiction over the project. An arbitration panel ("panel") determined the project was located on a flowing stream and the FCD
therefore had jurisdiction over the project. The panel's decision also
necessarily upheld FCD's denial of the Paulsons' permit petition. As a
result, the Paulsons filed a motion in the Flathead County District
Court to vacate the panel's decision.
The Paulsons contended the dispute involved ajurisdictional issue
between administrative agencies that the court needed to decide the
issue. The Paulsons also questioned the legitimacy of appointing a
former state agency official to the panel. Specifically, the Paulsons argued a former Montana Department of Fish, Wildlife, and Parks
("FWP") employee could not be an impartial arbiter. The district
court granted FCD's motion for judgment on the pleadings and the
Paulsons appealed to the Montana Supreme Court.
The Paulsons asserted the question of whether FCD or FRDO had
proper jurisdiction was properly decided by the district court, not an
arbitration panel. FCD contended it could make determinations of
water status and that its internal arbitration panel had the authority to
review FCD decisions in order to resolve all factual and legal issues arising from disputes. Montana generally gives arbitrators broad authority
to decide both legal and factual questions, and courts uphold such
decisions upon review if the decisions are rationally derived from the
agreement to arbitrate. The agreement to arbitrate, in this case, called
for review by an arbitration panel if a party was unsatisfied. However,
state law severely limited judicial review of the arbitration decision.
In this instance, the test laid out in Bitterroot River Prot. Ass'n v. Bitterroot ConservationDist. applied. The Bitterroot test stated for a court to
interfere with an agency's determination of its jurisdiction: (1) the
agency's jurisdiction must be plainly lacking, (2) forcing a party to exhaust its remedies must result in irreparable injury, and (3) the
agency's special expertise must be of no help on the question of jurisdiction. The court ruled FCD's jurisdiction was not plainly lacking
because it was logical for the agency involved to determine what constituted a stream. The court also concluded that requiring the Paulsons
to exhaust administrative remedies would not result in irreparable injury. Finally, FCD's expertise was not without value, as FCD and FRDO
asserted concurrent jurisdiction over Flathead Lake throughout the
history of the agencies. For these reasons, the court held the arbitra-
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tion panel did not abuse its power and it had the proper authorization
to make the decisions regarding the Paulsons' permit.
Next, the court determined a former employee of a state agency is
not automatically barred from serving as an arbitrator in a case where
the same agency is a party. As long as the individual was a resident of
the judicial district in which the arbitration occurred and the judge
chose the individual from the lists of potential arbiters submitted by
FWP, FCD, and the permit applicant, then the person could be an arbitrator. The former FWP employee that served as an arbitrator in this
case met both of these conditions. Additionally, the court had previously held prior employment was insufficient to establish partiality per
se. The Paulsons' argument of partiality was therefore speculative and
conclusory at best.
Thus, the arbitration panel had the statutory authority to make
permit determinations, was impartial in making its decision, and provided adequate remedies for permit application review. For these reasons, the court upheld the ruling of the district court not to vacate the
arbitration panel's decision.
John Lintzenich
NEBRASKA
In re Applications T-851 and T-852, 686 N.W.2d 360 (Neb. 2004) (holding the Department of Natural Resources properly reduced the allocation of incidental groundwater storage rights in proportion to a decrease in state power district's direct irrigation service).
The Nebraska Public Power District ("NPPD") filed applications
with the Department of Natural Resources ("DNR") concerning two of
NPPD's water appropriations. The NPPD filed the applications after
one of its water users, Terry Crawford, ceased use of NPPD's surface
water and began irrigating his land with well water. NPPD's applications requested a transfer of the location of diversion and use of two of
NPPD's water appropriation rights. NPPD believed the transfer was
necessary in order to avoid losing the water rights associated with
Crawford's land. The DNR approved the transfer for one application.
However, with respect to the second appropriation, the DNR cancelled
0.65 cubic feet per second ("cfs") of the NPPD's incidental groundwater storage allocation. The NPPD appealed this decision to the Supreme Court of Nebraska.
The DNR based its decision on language from a May 1988 order
("order") that originally granted water appropriation rights to the
NPPD, but also stipulated that a proportionate reduction in incidental
underground storage would accompany any reduction in direct irrigation service. Based on the terms of the order, the DNR concluded
Crawford's decision not to use the direct irrigation service consequently reduced the NPPD's direct irrigation service. Thus, pursuant

